The pilot was supposed to perform a ferry flight for the airplane owner. They were conducting a familiarization flight when the accident occurred. The owner told the pilot that he had added 25 gallons of fuel and the pilot did not perform his own preflight inspection. They departed on a flight around the pattern and experienced fuel exhaustion on the first time around. An off-airport landing followed with the airplane being substantially damaged.

There were no injuries. The NTSB probable cause states, "A total loss of engine power due to fuel starvation. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s failure toaccomplish a preflight inspection."

There were no injuries. Did the pilot think it would be okay to skip the preflight inspection just this once? Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.

Picture these two airplanes landing on opposite ends of the same runway at night. the NTSB accident report includes the following: "The private pilot of the Cessna was landing while the airline transport pilot of the Aero Commander was landing on the opposite runway during night visual meteorological conditions, after the airport control tower had closed. The Cessna pilot activated the runway approach lighting system and mistakenly believed that the green threshold lights indicated the direction for landing on the active runway. The pilot-controlled lighting system used a separate radio frequency from the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) at this airport. The Cessna pilot stated that he then “switched radio channels” and made “routine calls.” The Aero Commander pilot made radio announcements on the CTAF during each leg of the traffic pattern, announcing his location and intentions. Contrary to the Cessna pilot’s belief that the green lights he observed indicated the active runway (and the one on which he intended to land), they denoted the location of the (displaced) runway threshold of the adjacent runway. During landing rollout, the right-wing tip of the Cessna contacted the underside of the right wing of the Aero Commander, which had landed on the opposite runway, resulting in substantial damage to the Cessna’s right wing. The Cessna pilot reported that he did not hear any radio transmission from other aircraft operating at the time, and the pilot of the Aero Commander did not hear any radio transmissions from the Cessna pilot. Audio recordings of the CTAF frequency captured the radio transmissions made by the Aero Commander pilot (and other traffic) but did not capture any transmissions from the Cessna pilot. It is therefore likely that the Cessna pilot kept his single communications radio tuned to the pilot-controlled lighting frequency rather than change it to the CTAF as indicated in the airport/facility directory, which resulted in his communications not being heard by other pilots in the vicinity and his lack of awareness of the Aero Commander pilot’s position."

ADS-B track - Graphic Source: NTSB

Dekalb-Peachtree airport near Atlanta. FAA Airport Diagram with added annotations

Source of photos: NTSB

The NTSB probable cause states, "The Cessna pilot’s failure to tune his radio to the common traffic advisory frequency, which resulted in a lack of awareness of the other aircraft operating at the airport. Contributing to the accident was the Cessna pilot’s lack of understanding of the airport lighting system."

We know that we must look up and carefully use the correct radio frequencies. Is not doing so okay "Just this Once?"

Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.

The NTSB accident report includes the following, "The airline transport pilot departed on the instrument flight rules cross-country flight in night visual meteorological conditions with about 45 gallons of fuel, which, based on fuel burn rates, was sufficient for about 3 hours of flight. About 3 hours after departure and 50 miles from the destination airport, the pilot told air traffic control he was having engine problems and requested a vector to the nearest airport. A witness near the accident site heard the airplane descending and described the sound of an engine being re-started several times. The airplane came to rest in wooded terrain. Postaccident examination revealed the wing bladder tanks were intact, and no visible fuel was observed in either tank. When the wings were removed, a total of less than 2 quarts of fuel was drained from both the left and right fuel tanks. Examination of the airplane and engine revealed no pre-accident mechanical deficiencies that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot was aware that the left and right fuel tank bladders were bulging prior to the accident flight. The bulging fuel bladders may have resulted in erroneous fuel quantity readings during the flight. Given the absence of fuel in the airplane's fuel tanks and the length of flight that corresponded to the fuel available, the pilot likely departed without sufficient fuel to complete the flight to the intended destination and the loss of engine power was likely the result of fuel exhaustion."

The NTSB accident reort continues, "The pilot was found deceased, slumped over in the left seat, still wearing his lap belt. Although the airplane was equipped with a single shoulder harness (across the left shoulder), it was not secured to the lap belt at the time of the accident. The pilot's failure to have properly secured the shoulder harness at the time of the accident likely contributed to the severity of his injuries. Examination of the pilot's seatbelt and shoulder harness assembly revealed that the seat belt shoulder harness attachment post elastic grommet was not installed, nor was it found in the wreckage. When manually assembled, the shoulder harness attachment buckle would not seat securely to the seatbelt attachment post."

Photo source: NTSB

The NTSB probable cause finding states, "The pilot's improper preflight fuel planning, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion. Contributing to the severity of the pilot's injuries was his failure to have a properly secured shoulder harness at the time of the accident."

This experienced pilot must have known the importance of preflight planning and of the substantial survivable benefit if wearing the shoulder harness. Did either or both of his decisions regarding preflight planning and the use of the shoulder harness have an element of, it will be okay "just this once?" And if so, was the "just this once" decision made prior to this flight or had the decision been made in the past and the pilot had travelled down that slippery slope?

Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.