The NTSB report continues: "About 2003, the controller issued an intercept heading to the pilot and cleared him for the approach. About 2005, the pilot reported that the flight was established on the approach and the controller instructed the pilot to contact the control tower. The tower controller subsequently cleared the pilot to land; however, the pilot never responded. The airplane tracked inbound along the ILS runway 35 localizer. At 2006:58, the airplane passed the final approach fix (NITTE); the airplane’s altitude was about 2,258 ft msl at that time. After the airplane passed NITTE, the flight path appeared to become more erratic in comparison to the airplane flight path before passing NITTE. At 2008:15, the airplane entered a right turn approximately 2.25 miles from the runway. The final data point was recorded at 2008:29; the airplane’s altitude was about 1,045 ft msl at that time.
Airspeed and climb/descent rates derived from ADS-B position and altitude data indicated the airplane was stabilized about 3,000 ft msl and 120 knots until about 1959. The airspeed then decreased and appeared to stabilize about 110 knots with the airplane remaining about 3,000 ft msl. At 2002:20, a momentary altitude deviation was recorded consisting of a 200 ft loss immediately followed by a 300 ft gain. During this time, the airspeed initially increased and then decreased to as low as 90 knots before recovering. From 2003:00 until 2006:40, the airplane entered a general descent with momentary level offs or climbs. Airspeed during this timeframe increased to about 150 knots before decreasing again. Beginning at 2006:40, the airplane entered a continuous descent until the final data point. The average airplane descent rate between the final approach fix and the final ADS-B data point varied from about 400 fpm to over 1,200 fpm."

The NTSB probable cause finding states: "The pilot’s failure to follow the instrument landing system (ILS) course guidance, which resulted in the pilot’s loss of airplane control during the instrument approach. Contributing to the accident was the presence of turbulence and low-level wind shear."

Again, we see a family tragedy. Though the unstable approach was not mentioned in the probable cause finding, the approach was clearly unstable as mentioned in the analysis text. The pilot's workload during the approach caused the task load to exceed the pilot's capabilities. The pilot had completed a flight review twelve days prior to the crash. According to the pilot's logbook, copies of which are included in the accident docket, the flight review was conducted in a Cessna 172. A considerably slower and much less complex airplane than the Piper Lance. Also, the log entry for the flight review did not list any instrument flight time. The logbook listed actual instrument time as 110.3 and simulated instrument time as 52.7 hours respectively. The logbook appears to indicate that the pilot met recent experience requirements regarding instrument flight hours, but that he had logged only four of the six required instrument approaches. There is no indication of an instrument proficiency check having been completed.

We owe it to our families to take all reasonable steps to maintain our proficiency at a high level. We must be honest with ourselves regarding our capabilities for this flight, on this day, with our present level of proficiency.